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Time for a Political Climate Change?: How Elected Leaders
Influence Constituent Climate Change Attitudes
Alexis Jackson and Karen Villalba-Acosta, Washington University in St. Louis
Dr. Tat Chan, Advisor
Abstract: Among the counties bearing the greatest costs of climate change and natural
disasters, belief in global warming is lower. Our research explores this counterintuitive
relationship between experience of climate change and belief in climate change using Yale
Climate Change Project, elected officials rosters, and FEMA data from 2014 - 2019. Our
difference-in-difference regression model measures the county-level interaction effect of five
types natural disasters (hurricanes, wildfires, winter storms, severe storms, earthquakes) and the
partisanship of elected officials. We predict that the partisanship of a county’s elected officials
has a greater effect on the county’s belief in climate change than the experience of climate
change itself through FEMA-recognized natural disasters. This analysis raises questions of how
political parties discuss, portray, and weaponize climate change to shape voting behavior and
political attitudes toward the subject.
Replication Materials:
Bohr, Jeremiah. (2014). “Public views on the dangers and importance of climate change:
predicting climate change beliefs in the United States through income moderated by party
identification.” Climatic Change 126: 217–227, doi: 10.1007/s10584-014-1198-9
Howe, Peter D., et al. (2015). “Geographic variation in opinions on climate change at state and local scales in the
USA.” Nature Climate Change, doi:10.1038/nclimate2583.

“Disasters.” FEMA.gov, www.fema.gov/disasters.
“GovTrack.us.” GovTrack.us, www.govtrack.us/.

A

ccording to a recent study conducted
by the Pew Research Center, the
United States ranks among the bottom in the
percentage of residents who view climate
change as a pressing issue. Out of 26
countries, the United States placed 21st
above only Indonesia, Poland, Russia,
Nigeria and Israel (Poushter and Huang
2019).
Moreover, among the Americans
surveyed in the study, Republicans and
those who lean Republican are 56 percent
less likely to believe that global climate
change is a major threat to their country than
Democrats and those who lean Democrat
(Poushter and Huang 2019).

Academic research also supports the
relationship between Republican party
affiliation and belief in climate change.
Irrespective of income and education level,
Republicans are less likely to believe in
climate change (Hamilton 2009; Bohr 2014).
Despite rejecting the notion of climate
change, Republicans often reside in the
counties most effected by climate change
itself. The Brookings Institution quantified
the monetary impacts of climate change
damage at the county level and determined
that the counties that will incur the greatest
costs from climate change damage tend to
lean Republican (Muro et. al. 2019).

Using the Brookings data, we constructed
a simple linear regression to measure the
effect of a county’s projected climate change
cost on its average climate attitude. This
regression shows a significant, inverse
relationship between climate change cost
and belief (Appendix 1). Our simple
regression boasts a low correlation
coefficient, signaling that other factors are
needed to explain this seemingly
counterintuitive relationship between the
variables (Appendix 2). As the Brookings
data appears to suggest, perhaps partisanship
is a better predictor of climate attitudes than
experiencing climate change itself.
Political behavior research demonstrates
that the average partisan forms their issuebased beliefs by aligning with the platform
their political party promotes (Converse
1964). Instead of updating their opinions
when new information is received, partisans
tend to adjust their interpretation of the
information to match their preexisting
beliefs on the issue (Gaines et. al. 2007).
This raises an important question about
the role of elected officials and political
parties in sharing consistent, factual
information about climate change in an
effort to increase belief in the phenomenon
among constituents of all political stripes.
The disconnect between the two political
parties on the issue can present a challenge
for policymakers striving to mitigate the
looming effects of climate change,
particularly in the most vulnerable counties.
Our study assesses the effects of
partisanship of elected officials on the
climate change attitudes of their
constituents, and whether or not that effect is
greater than when a constituent experiences
a climate-related disaster.
Using data from the Yale Climate
Change Project from 2014 – 2019 and
FEMA, we construct a difference-indifference regression to test the county-level
effects of both partisanship of elected

officials, presence of a climate-related
disaster, and the interaction effect between
these elected officials and various disasters.
We find that Republican leadership has an
inverse effect on climate attitudes following
a natural disaster, on average. We also
observe a decline in overall climate attitudes
between 2016 – 2019.
Climate Change Attitudes
There is a robust body of work measuring
climate change attitudes of Americans along
different demographic factors. Most studies
include income, age, gender, and education
level in their analysis.
There is an inverse relationship between
belief in climate change and income level
(Bohr 2014). This relationship is also true
with education level (Hamilton 2009). The
effects of age and gender on climate change
belief are more muted (Hornsey et. al.
2016).
The effects of an American’s geographic
location on their belief in climate change
varies greatly depending on the region
surveyed. Proximity to the coast tends to
lead to higher believes in climate change
(Brody et. al. 2012). However, even after
suffering a severe drought in 2012,
Midwestern residents in the United States
did not demonstrate a heightened belief in
climate change (Carlton et. al. 2016).
Another important measure is the effect
of unseasonal weather on Americans’ belief
in climate change. From a sample of 5,000
phone calls to New Hampshire residents,
respondents were more credulous about
climate change on unseasonably warm days
than on unseasonably cold days (Hamilton
and Stampone 2013).
Nearly all of these studies include a
moderating variable for a respondent’s
political affiliation. Accounting for
partisanship, Bohr, Hamilton, and Carlton
et. al. find a decreased belief in climate
change among self-identified Republicans,

irrespective of the other variables in the
analysis (Bohr 2014; Hamilton 2009;
Hornsey et. al. 2016).
As partisanship emerges as the variable
most predictive of climate change attitudes,
the research paradigm must shift away from
identifying ‘who’ believes in climate change
to explaining ‘why’ one might believe in the
phenomenon, and vice versa (Hornsey et. al.
2016).
Influence of Elected Leaders
One force that may be driving individual
attitudes toward climate change is the issue
position of their elected official. Political
behavior research demonstrates that elected
officials and political party leaders play a
significant role in shaping the issue-based
attitudes of the general electorate.
Political scientist Philip Converse first
introduced the idea that party identification
is the best predictor of voting behavior.
Converse demonstrated that while the issuebased attitudes of Americans shifted over
time, their party affiliations remained
constant. Converse attributed the shift in
issue positions to Americans’ attempt to
align with their political parties as the issue
positions of the parties evolved (Converse
1964).
Converse’s findings suggest that
Americans are more likely to choose their
issue positions based on their political party
than choose their party based on their issue
positions. Once party allegiance is
established, Americans are less likely to
accept new information that would counter
the issue positions of their party. Rather,
partisans tend to interpret information in a
way that affirms their preexisting beliefs
(Gaines et. al. 2007). This behavior
complicates the process of disseminating
factual information to Americans of all
partisan stripes.
Recent response to the COVID-19
pandemic illustrates the severity of the

partisan divide in America. In a NPR poll
from March 2020, over 50 percent of
Republicans considered the threat of the
coronavirus to be ‘exaggerated,’ compared
to less than 20 percent of Democrats
(NPR/PBS Newshour/Marist Poll 2020).
Much of the variance in partisan response
to the virus can be attributed to the rhetoric
of elected officials in each party. Until
recently, President Donald Trump
downplayed the severity of the virus,
comparing it to the ‘seasonal flu.’
Republican representative Devin Nunez of
California even encouraged constituents to
continue to dine out after health officials
recommended the opposite. Conversely,
Democratic governors in states like
California and New York quickly declared
states of emergency and urged residents to
shelter in place (Brownstein 2020).
While the geographical outbreak of the
virus certainly plays a role in its partisan
response, elected officials are also at fault.
Just as Converse predicted in 1964, many
Americans have formed their attitude about
the virus from those of their party leaders.
Hypothesis
Belief in climate change may follow a
similar trend as COVID-19. As the parties
take clear and distinct stances on the issue,
Americans could be following suit,
regardless of how climate change may be
affecting their everyday lives.
Our regression model will explore this
phenomenon by testing the effect of party
leadership and climate disasters on
constituents’ climate attitudes. Following
the results of prior research on climate
attitudes, we predict that party leadership
will have a greater effect on constituents’
attitudes than experiencing climate change
itself.
We believe that our research will be
valuable to policymakers and organizational

leaders seeking to align the message on climate change and spur policy action.
Data
Climate Change Sentiment
Our source of climate change sentiment data was Yale Climate Change Project from 2014 –
2019 (Howe et al. 2015). In this study, the average value of percentage belief in climate change
per county was 61.99 with a 6.11 standard deviation.
Figure 1: Climate Change Sentiment Throughout Experiment

Climate Change Sentiment
Year
2014
2016
2018
2019
Grand Total

Average of Climate
Sentiment %
59.09
64.68
63.99
60.19
61.99

Figure 2: Average Climate Change Sentiment 2014-2019

Federal Elected Officials
We used publicly available data through govtrack.gov to gather information on each county’s
Senators and Member(s) of Congress.
After overlaying the climate change sentiment data with partisan senatorial data, political
trends emerged. Over the course of the years studied, counties with two Democratic Senators
showed a higher percentage of climate change belief.
Figure 3: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Elected Senators 2014-2019

Figure 4: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Percentage of House Representation
2014-2019

Governors
Due to the lack of a centralized database of State Governors, we manually gathered data on
Governors through State websites.
Similar to the data for federal officials, the gubernatorial data demonstrated an increased
belief in climate change over the course of our study in states with a Democratic Governor.
Figure 5: Average Climate Change Sentiment by Elected Governors 2014-2019

Natural Disasters
Our climate disaster data encompassed four years and five types of disasters as categorized by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Over the course of the years we studied, there
were 135 wildfires, 63 earthquakes, 3,320 severe storms, 411 winter storms, and 1,267
hurricanes in the United States. The table below details the distribution of disasters across the
years we studied.
Figure 6: Natural Disasters Total 2016-2019

Natural Disasters
Year
Hurricane Wildfire Winter Storm Severe Storm Earthquake
2016
359
0
237
807
0
2018
472
135
21
1291
5
2019
436
0
153
1222
58
Grand Total
1267
135
411
3320
63

Figure 7: Total Natural Disasters by Type 2014-2019

Figure 8: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Hurricane 2014-2019

Figure 9: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Winter Storm 2014-2019

Figure 10: Total Natural Disasters by Type 2014-2019

Figure 11: Climate Change Sentiment by Occurrence of Earthquake 2014-2019

Methods
Variables
To select our dependent variable from the Yale climate data, we conducted a Two-Factor
Analysis.
Figure 12: Two-Factor Analysis Component Matrix
Component Matrixa
Variable Name
happening
human
worried
harmUS
devharm
futuregen
timing
consensus
CO2limits
supportRPS
personal
fundrenewables
regulate
Extraction Method: Principal
Component Analysis.a
a. 1 components extracted.

Component
0.965
0.957
0.955
0.949
0.943
0.935
0.921
0.91
0.902
0.89
0.842
0.795
0.721

This procedure analyzed the variability
between responses to each survey question.
The question, “Do you believe climate
change is happening?” explained 96.5
percent of the variability in the responses.
Therefore, we believe that this survey
question alone captures the general climate
change sentiment of the population across
the range of the survey questions.
To select our independent variables, we
began with sorting the FEMA natural
disasters data. We chose to include
wildfires, earthquakes, severe storms, winter
storms, and hurricanes in our analysis
because instances of these natural disasters
have been linked to climate change. The
FEMA data was the only data set in our
analysis not available on a county-level,
meaning that any county in a state with a
FEMA-recognized natural disaster was
assigned a “1” for that disaster type in a
given year.
To code for the partisanship of elected
officials, we used an indicator variable.
Republican Senators received a 0.5 for each
county they represent. Republican
Congressmembers were assigned to a county
through a weighted average based on the
population distribution of each
congressional district.
To analyze the way in which each
category of elected officials interacted with

the FEMA-recognized natural disasters, we
included fifteen interaction terms. These
terms indicate if the effect of one
independent variable on the dependent
variable is different at each value of the
other independent variable.
Regression
To construct our regression, we used a
difference-in-difference approach to account
for the county fixed effect. With this model,
every independent variable and interaction
term is equal to the difference between that
year’s value and the value of the previous
year.
We also accounted for the year fixed
effect to mitigate any causality issues with
our regression. To ensure that our regression
measured the effect of elected officials on
climate attitudes and not the reverse, we
included two indicator variables. With only
four years to measure, we are working in
differences. This means that the intercept
represents the differences in climate
attitudes observed between 2014 – 2016;
2016 – 2018 represents the difference
between 2016 – 2018; and 2018 – 2019
represents the difference between 2018 –
2019.
We used an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression to test our hypothesis
because our independent variable was
continuous.

Figure 13: Regression Results

Regression Results
Variables
Estimate
Std. Error
t value
Pr(>|t|)
2014-2016
5.53046
0.04575
120.873 < 2e-16 ***
2016-2018
-6.13525
0.0616
-99.597 < 2e-16 ***
2018-2019
-9.46385
0.06508
-145.417 < 2e-16 ***
Hurricane
1.14405
0.20999
5.448 5.22E-08 ***
Wildfire
0.67081
0.35345
1.898 0.05774 .
Severe Storm
0.42857
0.11842
3.619 0.0003 ***
Winter Storm
0.15706
0.24045
0.653 0.51365
Earthquake
1.60044
0.41696
3.838 0.00013 ***
Republican Senator
1.3612
0.14354
9.483 < 2e-16 ***
Republican Rep
0.89115
0.12586
7.08 1.54E-12 ***
Republican Governor
-0.46664
0.08154
-5.723 1.08E-08 ***
Senator * Hurricane
0.45964
0.2101
2.188 0.02871 *
House Rep * Hurricane
-1.59286
0.19277
-8.263 < 2e-16 ***
Governor * Hurricane
-0.6331
0.19896
-3.182 0.00147 **
Senator * Wildfire
-1.21148
0.47161
-2.569 0.01022 *
House Rep * Wildfire
0.28224
0.55937
0.505 0.61387
Governor * Wildfire
NA
NA
NA
NA
Senator * Severe Storm
0.29488
0.11855
2.487 0.01289 *
House Rep * Severe Storm
-1.39982
0.12007
-11.658 < 2e-16 ***
Governor * Severe Storm
0.31289
0.10111
3.095 0.00198 **
Senator * Earthquake
NA
NA
NA
NA
House Rep * Earthquake
-0.13711
0.77832
-0.176 0.86017
Governor * Earthquake
NA
NA
NA
NA
Senator * Winter Storm
1.04087
0.32871
3.166 0.00155 **
House Rep * Winter Storm
1 -1.37403
0.31105
-4.417 1.01E-05 ***
Governor * Winter Storm
0.35601
0.20546
1.733 0.08317 .
Notes:
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 2.213 on 9400 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.7601, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7595
F-statistic: 1354 on 22 and 9400 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Results
Our results present several important
findings for understanding political behavior
as it relates to climate change. To best
interpret our coefficients, we will begin with
the results by each natural disaster category,
followed by the year fixed effects, and
finishing with a discussion of the
implications of our findings.
Hurricane
The Hurricane coefficient can be
interpreted as the increase in climate change
belief following a hurricane in a county
where all elected leaders are Democrats (all
indicator variables are equal to zero). With a
Republican Senator, counties report a 0.45
percent increase in climate change belief.
However, with a Republican
Congressmember and/or Governor, it
decreases climate change belief by 1.59 and
0.63 percent, respectively. Therefore, in a
county that has a Republican in each post
included in our analysis, the overall effect
on climate attitudes following a hurricane
would be a decline of 0.62 percent.
Wildfire
The Wildfire coefficient is not
statistically significant. One possible
explanation for this result could be the
recent California wildfires caused by the
poor maintenance of a P&G electric line
(not a climate-related cause). The human
cause of this disaster could have influenced
the way in which constituents relate
wildfires to climate change.
Because the coefficient is not statistically
significant, we must assume an effect of
zero as a starting point from which we can
compare the wildfire interaction effects.
With a Republican Senator, belief in climate
change decreases by 1.21 percent.
Republican Congressmembers do not have a
statistically significant impact. Republican

Governors show an effect of “N/A” because
no wildfire was registered under a
Republican Governor’s term throughout the
years of our study. Therefore, in a county
that has at least one Republican Senator, the
overall effect on climate attitudes following
a wildfire would be a decline of 1.21
percent.
Severe Storm
For a severe storm, climate sentiment
increases by 0.43 percent with a Democrat
in every post we included. With a
Republican Senator and/or Republican
Governor, this belief increases by 0.29 and
0.31 percent, respectively. However, with a
Republican Congressmember, belief in
climate change decreases by 1.40 percent.
Therefore, in a state that has a Republican in
each post included in our analysis, the
overall effect on climate attitudes following
a severe storm would be a decline of 0.37
percent.
Winter Storm
The Winter Storm coefficient is also not
statistically significant. Winter storms are
often the most politically polarizing disaster,
used as an argument against the Earth’s
warming. In fact, many of President
Trump’s attacks on global warming are
related to the increase of snowstorms in the
U.S. (Cheung 2020). The conflicting
discussion on the cause of winter storms
could be responsible for the statistically
insignificant result.
Starting from an assumption of zero
effect, having a Republican Senator
increases a county’s climate change belief
by 1.04 percent following a winter storm.
With a Republican Congressmember,
climate change belief decreases by 1.37
percent. For a Republican Governor, the
interaction term is not statistically
significant. Therefore, with a Republican

Senator and Congressmember, a county has
a 0.33 percent overall decline in climate
change belief following a winter storm.
Earthquake
After an earthquake, belief in climate
change increases by 1.60 percent with a
Democratic leader in every post we
included. The earthquake interaction term is
not significant with a Republican
Congressmember and is not observable
under Republican senatorial or gubernatorial
leadership. We cannot make a decisive
conclusion about the interaction effect of
Republican leadership and an earthquake,
likely due to the rarity of the event.
Year Fixed Effect
Perhaps the most striking trend in our
data is the decreased climate sentiment
observed between 2014 – 2019. Our
intercept represents a 5.53 percent increase
in climate change belief between 2014 –
2016. After 2016, belief in climate drops by
6.13 percent between 2016 – 2018 and by
9.46 percent between 2018 – 2019. These
values signal an overall decline in climate
change sentiment across the country, despite
an increase in climate-related disasters
during the same time frame.
One explanation of this trend could be
the election of President Trump in 2016. The
President’s climate policy departs markedly
from that of President Obama. President
Trump has called climate change “a hoax”
and repeatedly denied global warming
through tweets (Cheung 2020). With a
difference-in-difference model, we cannot
test the effect of a Republican presidency on
county-level climate change belief, as the
indicator variable would be uniform across
our model. However, if we were able to
gather a greater expanse of climate change
sentiment data spanning several presidential
administrations, we could observe a greater

variation in general climate attitudes under
different parties. If former Vice President
Joe Biden wins the 2020 presidential
election, future Yale Climate Change Survey
Data should be able to capture the “Election
Effect” of a Democratic President compared
to the tenure of President Trump.
Hypothesis Revisited
Our hypothesis conjectured that the
partisanship of elected officials would have
a greater effect on climate attitudes than the
experience of a natural disaster. Our
research results confirm our hypothesis
when analyzing the difference in climate
change belief following a natural disaster
under Republican leadership (the interaction
term in our model). Across all interaction
terms, counties report a 0.69 percent average
decrease in climate change belief following
a natural disaster under Republican
leadership. Therefore, it follows that two
counties who experience the same natural
disaster under all-Democratic leadership and
all-Republican leadership will report a 0.69
lower climate change belief in the
Republican treatment condition.
This result is consistent with that of
political behavior research. As the two
political parties establish their distinct
positions on climate change, individual
partisans will assume the issue position of
their party, and will interpret the
significance of a climate-related event in a
way that aligns with their party’s position on
climate change itself. In this sense, our
hypothesis is correct. Elected officials have
a greater effect on climate attitudes than the
experience of climate change itself, as it is
the partisanship of elected officials that
determines the way in which an individual
responds to the presence of a climate-related
disaster.
This logic best explains the results of our
simple regression using the Brookings
climate change cost data. Counties with the

highest projected climate costs are less
likely to consider climate change a threat.
These counties are also overwhelmingly
Republican. Therefore, as our paper
suggests, the ability for partisan leaders to
influence the way in which climate events
are interpreted is likely what drives this
difference in climate attitudes, not the
increased occurrence of climate change
disasters in these regions.
It is worth noting, however, that the 0.69
percent difference in climate attitudes
between all-Republican and all-Democratic
counties following a natural disaster is quite
minimal. While elected officials in each
party take a distinctly different average
position on the issue, these leaders are still
confined to the norms of their position as
elected officials. In the wake of a natural
disaster, playing partisan politics is
generally considered to be inappropriate.
Therefore, the minimal difference in climate
attitudes between Republican and
Democratic constituents is likely a reflection
of the small—but observable—difference in
the disaster response of elected partisans.
Conclusion
Our data paints a complicated picture of
climate attitudes in America. On average,
climate attitudes decrease following a
natural disaster under Republican leadership
relative to Democratic leadership. As the
threat of climate change continues to grow,
elected officials of all partisan stripes have
the responsibility to unite the American
people on the issue and mitigate the
environmental, economic, and health-related
harm that may result from a denial of its
impact.
Further research should employ textual
analysis to explore the climate change
rhetoric of elected officials before and after
a natural disaster to better understand what
drives the difference between climate
attitudes under Republican and Democratic

leaders. As counties accumulate costs from
climate-related disasters, elected leaders
must ask themselves: what is the value of
my issue position and how much am I
willing to let my constituents sacrifice to
maintain that position?
Further, the declining belief in climate
change from 2016 – 2019 presents another
challenge for elected leaders. Whether or not
future research finds a causal link between
the President’s climate change position and
decreasing climate attitudes, tomorrow’s
leaders bear a considerable burden in
reversing this decline.
If political behavior research holds true,
the decline in climate attitudes among the
general public is influenced by the lackluster
response to climate disasters across elected
leaders. If the United States truly seeks
action on climate change, it might be time
for a political change as well.
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Appendix 1: Regression Results County Damages on Climate Sentiment
Coefficients
60.34065442
8.44708E-06
-0.175213818

Intercept
TotalPop
Total damages (% county income)

Standard Error
0.137132251
4.12984E-07
0.018304921

t Stat
440.0179669
20.45377161
-9.571951645

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics County Damages on Climate Sentiment
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.378447864
0.143222785
0.142676894
5.76699166
3142

P-value
0
2.17144E-87
2.05044E-21

